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 In 2007, political scientist Christian Davenport was confident enough to claim that “there 
have never been any analyses of the conditions under which governments effectively eliminate 
or reduce dissent; there have only been empirical investigations that reveal that occasionally 
repression increases and/or decreases the activity of state challengers” (10). That this absence 
appears to remain over ten years later speaks to a pressing need within the study of non-
democratic governments. Why has this insufficiency persisted? Scholars’ measurement methods 
do not adequately assess the conditions that limit or amplify autocrats’ repressive power. 
Oftentimes, studies count protesters or use public opinion data as proxies for leaders’ success in 
reducing dissident activity over time (Dollbaum, 2016). These measures, however, do not tell the 
entire story. A place’s history, culture, and social-governmental relationships condition what 
mobilizes people to action, and likewise, the effectiveness of efforts to repress that mobilization. 
That repressive governments continually expand their toolbox with new digital mechanisms for 
surveilling their citizens and predicting unruly behavior makes the costs and benefits even harder 
for observers, and participants, to calculate. Activists, hoping to undermine tyrants, must play 
within the rules of the game that these tools create, or innovate in ways that subvert their 
governments’ wishes. Farrel (2012) pointed to the challenges in establishing the causal links 
between the motivations behind these repressive tools and their effectiveness in empirical terms. 
For these reasons, this paper cannot answer Davenport’s assertion by conclusively analyzing the 
conditions of effective repression. Instead, I address these challenges by suggesting possible 
causal pathways that change repression patterns and extend the methodologies by which one may 
study them. Cyber-regulatory policies, due to their opaque nature, make for a “difficult case,” if 
we can develop more sophisticated measurement tools for assessing the impact of such policies, 
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then repression theorists are better off, and activists might more readily respond to repressive 
authoritarians. 
Globalization, and accelerating technological sophistication, transform the lifestyles of 
everyone they affect. The internet’s decentralized, global infrastructure makes it difficult to 
dismantle, and over time, the degree of internet access continues to increase almost everywhere. 
It mediates politics. Almost any large-scale political event is news and conversation-worthy, and 
the internet provides a forum for anyone to debate anything. Internet usage empowers opinion 
formation and collective action, online petitions and offline organizing. Because the internet does 
not appear to be a temporary phenomenon, and changes peoples’ lives and their methods and 
preferences for political engagement, the topic is essential to study. While globally, internet 
traffic rates continue to rapidly accelerate (Pew Research, 2016), emerging economies claim the 
greatest share of internet access and Internet Protocol traffic growth. Consequently, the 
internet's prevailing demographics will shift in favor of new internet users. This change in the 
distribution of internet users, less disproportionately Western and more representative of the 
Global South, means that the future of the internet's usage, governance, and evolution partially 
rests in their hands. The regions of the world with the lowest amount of internet access per capita 
tend to also host non-democratic regimes. Increasing internet access rates imply greater online 
participation in politics, and more surveillance and censorship by repressive regimes. 
While the internet used to be a libertarian haven free from the law, political regimes have, 
in recent years, proven themselves nimble controllers of internet access and their reputations, as 
a product of online discussions and criticism of their governance. Repressive politicians have 
long controlled public narratives and quelled offline protest within their borders. With online, 
deterritorialized options, activists might circumvent authoritarian control to call for free and fair 
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elections or denounce human rights violations. Or, these governments might gain the upper hand, 
given advances in big data collection and artificial intelligence, to predict and respond to activist 
activity before it begins. Because the internet and the technical tools used to free or repress 
civilian populations in autocratic environments continually increase in their reach and power, we 
do not know which party gains more, and what other factors, such as laws, institutions, 
geography, and political culture, might tip the scales. Understanding how repressive 
governments constrain internet activism contributes to our understanding political dynamics in 
spaces whose citizens are increasingly online. 
This project pertains particularly to activists in non-democratic states, although all types 
of governments could gain a wider understanding of how the internet affects their relationship 
with their citizens, and increasingly, those of other governments. The paper’s methodological 
contributions assist academics in conflict studies, comparative politics, internet and 
telecommunication studies, and the protest and social movements scholarship. Garret (2006) 
points to the “sometimes-contradictory findings in the literature” regarding technology’s political 
consequences, dependent upon context. Internet telecommunication technologies (ICTs) are at 
least popularly believed to upend traditional political relationships, and past research indicates 
they play a new role. Their widespread, constant presence, alongside expectations that they will 
continually evolve and proliferate, renders this absence in the literature detrimental to political 




II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
This paper examines the mobilization of anti-regime protest under repressive conditions. 
To that end, it investigates the theoretical background of several interrelated concepts. First, how 
do people traditionally organize and network under autocratic regimes, lobbying their 
government for change and protesting the lack thereof? How do dictatorships (i.e., governments 
without competitive democratic opposition) manage their relationships with their populations, 
and how does repression shape protest dynamics? And finally, how do internet and 
telecommunication technologies (ICTs) affect these processes; who do they help or hinder? 
Conventional Wisdom 
Scholars investigate protest through studies of political participation, conflict, social 
movements, and internet development. In the broadest sense, a protest is a method and output of 
collective action. Academics have discussed a wide variety of collective action issues, not all of 
which are political. Collective action theory offers explanations for how individuals interact with 
one another towards common ends that would be difficult to achieve individually. Relatedly, 
resource mobilization theory explains how various actors access and instrumentalize the tools at 
their disposal towards specific ends. Scholars also discuss the impact of repression upon these 
dynamics, and the role of ICTs in politics as an extension of the digital communications 
literature. 
Within the field of comparative politics, the collective action literature examines how 
individuals undertake actions for their own and others’ interests, even when doing so might 
cause then harm, or when the benefits to the individual fail to outweigh their costs 
(Ostrom:2009). Scholars emphasize both structural factors and temporal variables that condition 
accomplishment of the collective goal. Collective action’s structural elements consist of the 
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number of participants, the homogeneity of their backgrounds and beliefs, the method by which 
they communicate, and whether the “good” or goal they are aiming to achieve can be fully 
shared or declines in quantity as it is used by more participants. Temporal conditions shape how 
participants view each other. Information regarding past events and actions, and previous 
linkages and histories between individuals shape community trust, reputations, and expectations. 
Individuals enter into collective action arrangements dependent upon their interests, but scholars 
debate the weights individuals apply to those interests, and the individuals’ final calculations to 
join their resources with those of others. Individuals are more willing to join groups if they do 
not face requirements to contribute themselves. The ability to free-ride lowers perceived costs for 
joining groups, often at that group’s detriment. 
When collective action targets a regime, it is inherently political and contentious; these 
three elements constitute contentious politics, which Tilly (2008) defines as the series of 
“interactions in which actors make claims bearing on someone else's interest, in which 
governments appear either as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties” (5). Protest is a type of 
activism, but unlike campaigns to spread awareness, protest advances an agenda that if realized, 
would directly affect another’s interest (Sharp, 1973). Protest may or may not be violent, but it 
generally occurs outside of the confines of traditional civic institutions, where a formal 
complaint might be launched and processed bureaucratically. Protest participants employ a 
“repertoire of contention,” mobilizing their base and advancing their agenda. The contents of this 
repertoire are dependent upon participants’ resources and experiences. “Contention” against a 
regime might include strikes, demonstrations, or even riots. Protesters might demand signatures 
for an online petition or hack government computer servers. At one end of the spectrum are mere 
speeches expressing disapproval, and at the other is revolution overthrowing the regime. These 
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actions may be the result of immediate reactions to “destabilizing events,” such as a new law or a 
natural disaster, or they may be an output of longer-term grievances (McAdam, 2018).  
We would find it exhausting to constantly protest everything that upsets us. Rather, 
individuals must be mobilized from rest to protest in specific instances. Motivations to protest 
may be personal and not clearly defined, perhaps due to peer pressure and not political fervor, or 
targeted towards ends in which they feel themselves deeply invested. This mobilization may take 
the form of physical attendance, but it also includes the resources protesters and their 
organizations use, including signs, money, and recruits, who must be trained and motivated in 
turn (Edwards and Gilham:2013). Given these conditions, the literature conceptualizes varying 
“potential” for an individual or group to protest. 
 I define protest potential as “the individual propensity to engage in unconventional forms 
of political behavior as a means of political redress” (Marsh et al. 1979:59). If there were no 
pressures reducing the potential for protest, then one might protest perpetually until their 
demands were met. The maximum one could protest is dependent upon myriad factors, from the 
individual’s time commitments to the specific interest or issue motivating their protest. 
Moreover, “the position one takes on a given issue are crucial for whether or not one's general 
propensity to engage in collective action is transformed into an issue-specific potential, and, 
eventually, into political action” (Kriesi, Saris, and Wille: 1993). By contrast, mobilizational 
potential marks the capacity for a group of individuals to protest. According to McAdam et al. 
(1988: 706), there is normally a gap between the mobilization potential of a social movement and 
actual participation in the movement's campaigns. Like protest potential, mobilizational potential 
is dependent upon the issue area and salient political arena at hand, among other factors.  
Garner 10 
 
To mobilize protesters, activists apply collective action frames, which offer a normative 
interpretation of history and ongoing events. They are mindsets that “identify injustices, attribute 
blame, propose solutions, and motivate collective action” (Staggenborg, 2016:23). These frames 
intend to identify social problems and explain how to overcome them (Martin, 2007). As a social 
mobilization method, they may be implemented by influential individuals and toward peripheral 
communities. Frames create space for trust and accountability regarding leaders and a collective 
identity facilitative of individual self-esteem and higher quality social relationships (Rogers et 
al:2018). They undergird social movements, which Tarrow refers to as “sustained claim-making 
campaigns” operating within political opportunity structures (2007). Social movements, in turn, 
often constitute the essential apparatuses by which protest mobilization can transpire. 
The social movement literature captures many communicative dynamics of protest 
mobilization. Activists do not necessarily work within a social movement, but being member of 
one and co-opting its collective action frames can facilitate mobilization to activists’ cause. 
Narratives undergirding social movements often shape the vocabulary activists use to mobilize 
protesters. As such, social movements provide the context for many protests. Activists tend to 
work together to specialize, mobilize, and lobby collectively as part of movements (Campbell, 
2013). They may bureaucratically organize or operate through informal, grassroots networks. 
Their structure facilitates their communication, intra-group learning, and inspiration. According 
to McAdam (2018), political opportunities, organizational capacity, and “the emergence of an 
oppositional consciousness shape the rise of a movement and its prospects for success” (21). 
This oppositional consciousness stems from the above political opportunity debates, and tends to 
address the level of the state apparatus that is most likely to bend to their demands (Szymanski, 
Garner 11 
 
2003). The oppositional consciousness can pronounce clear political goals, identify wrongness in 
the status quo, and voices plans for revising the system. Repression shrinks its operational space. 
The contentious politics literature examines anti-regime protest mobilization, but little 
empirical work has investigated the effects of online action on offline action. With internet 
access, activists tend to have more media at their disposal. Much of what one reads online is 
politicized, whether they like it or not. The internet offers populations new routes into political 
consciousness and therefore contentious political action. By contrast, cyber-savvy autocrats have 
recently added to their repertoires of repression. Non-transparent surveillance, censorship, deep-
packet inspection, internet kill switches, and big data analysis all can be used to enhance 
governments' capacity to regulate the lives of those under their jurisdiction (Deibert, Rohinski, 
and Zittrain, 2011). Stein (2017) has reached inconclusive evidence regarding whether ICTs have 
“democratized dictatorships” by opening new forums for individuals to converse, identify each 
other’s views, and organize collectively, or whether despots can more effectively apply 
technology to constrain protesters. 
Collective action differs from “connective action” (Bennett and Segerberg:2012). In the 
former, activist organizations tend to be hierarchical. They disseminate messages downward 
from leaders to private individuals, volunteers, and other activists through collective action 
frames. Connective action, on the other hand, uses personal action frames and individualized 
actions. Personal reference frames, however, are more self-serving and more motivational 
towards more specific aims than their collective counterparts. Via collective and connective 
action, online individuals find themselves better equipped to organize independently. In the right 
political context, one can start a petition from their computer with hundreds of thousands of 
signatures without having had training as an activist. As such, cyberprotest might lead to a 
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proliferation of independent actions; it could be harder to organize and corral into sustained, 
systematic governmental opposition when individuals act out without leadership or coordination, 
and it may undermine legitimacy in the movement that motivated them in the first place, easing 
the efforts of repressive governments aiming to quell dissent. 
By the “law of coercive responsiveness,” challenges to the government’s status quo will 
entail some form of repressive response (Davenport, 2007). Given a dearth of accountability and 
legitimacy, dictators may be the source of relatively more criticism than democratic leaders, 
incentivizing them to repress their critics and prevent their denizens from opposing them in the 
first place. According to Earl (2003), there are many different types of protest controls employed 
by dictators, based on the relationships between the protesters, repressive agents, and the type of 
coercion or pressure. Traditional repressive actions include unjustified detention, asset forfeiture, 
racketeering, and the gratuitous presence of uniformed soldiers patrolling street blocks. The 
internet has endowed autocrats and activists with new means for interacting with one another, 
and for repressive methods to interoperate (Saleh, 2012). Given the relative novelty and 
increasing complexity of digital tools, the literature has yet to gather much empirical evidence 
regarding how precisely they affect a dictator’s calculus (Garret, 2007; Farrel, 2014; Stoycheff, 
2018).  
There are various ways to "control information" online. China regularly censors online 
information by removing critical pages from search engines and social media. Tracing IP 
addresses has enabled police to arrest dissident bloggers (Deibert, 2011; Goldsmith and Wu, 
2006). To quell unrest, governments have installed and operated internet “kill switches” that 
temporarily disconnect restive areas from the internet (Howard and Hussain, 2011; Kathuria, 
2018). Weiss (2016) has argued that greater degrees of control over information flows correlate 
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negatively with escalation after states repress. Foreign pressures can provide an outlet for 
repressed citizens to communicate with one another and make their preferences known, despite 
government efforts (Kuran, 1987).  
Literature Debates 
The digital politics literature addresses the internet in three ways. First, a critical 
sociological school challenges the notion of the internet as a “tool” instrumentalized by 
governments and end-users and instead emphasizes its covariance, in how it affects and is 
affected by its global userbase (Deibert, 1997). Second, scholars have studied how online action 
has a power of its own; cyberspace creates opportunity for actions simply impossible offline 
(Lessig, 2006). Rather than investigate the policy impacts of cybercrime or hacktivism, the paper 
examines the third dimension: how does internet activity amplify or nullify offline political 
action? 
Scholars examine three major intervening mechanisms by which the internet may lead to 
offline political outcomes, according to Farrel (2012). First, it can reduce preference falsification, 
by which individuals feel the need to shield their real preferences to protect themselves from 
violent government censors. The anonymity of online communication, some scholars argue, 
might encourage individuals to honestly portray their political opinions. Knowledge of consensus 
could facilitate mobilization because collective organizers could gauge who and how many they 
could recruit, but it is difficult to measure this effect without gauging an individual’s honesty 
offline. Second, the internet can create an environment conducive to homophily, whereby 
individuals can more easily find and cultivate relationships with those who share their views. 
Online forums (such as subreddits) enable individuals who would never meet offline to bond 
over shared interests digitally. If those interests are political, then social consciousness and 
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activism may result. Finally, the internet can lower the costs of organization and collective action 
(Ruijgrok, 2017). Social media sites enable event planners to rapidly gain a following, 
communicate a message to millions, and organize incidents of protest at almost zero financial 
cost. Planners can better gauge public opinion (through Facebook polls and clearly voiced 
preferences that can be easily tweeted) and redirect their messaging and contention repertoires to 
more effectively mobilize constituents and recruit new ones. 
The literature is deficient in empirical analysis regarding precisely how the internet 
causally effects protest outcomes, but it is conventionally understood that the internet’s 
communicative features are its most significant dimension for politics (Garret, 2006). Generally, 
ICTs affect politics in degree and form. First, ICTs make communication that would have 
happened anyway happen more quickly. Social media, forums, chat rooms, emails, encrypted 
instant messaging, visual imagery and video-sharing apps have not merely reduced distances 
between conversation members, but eliminated them entirely. Moreover, the proliferation and 
accessibility of information through hyperlinked web-pages and search engines have made it 
easier for individuals to learn and share data about themselves, their allies, leaders, events, and 
ideas, and their enemies. Theoretically, the internet makes it less costly to obtain up-to-date 
information, particularly from the media, and reduces the number and thickness of institutions 
one must cut through to identify and meet similarly interested parties. 
A wealth of literature applies these concepts to debate how actors mobilize and sustain 
protest. The political and organizational context (Zald, 1973), economic situation (Paige, 1975, 
Bermeo and Bartels:2014), institutional design (Vráblíková, 2014), international environment, 
political values (Grasso and Giugni:2018) and social history can all play a role in how many 
participants will protest, to what degree, for how long, where, and in what way. Eisinger (1973) 
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first described the “political opportunity structure,” that represents the (perceived or actual) 
degree of vulnerability of a political system to challengers. The interaction of strategies, 
cleavages, and alliances among domestic groups shape how dissenters engage their authorities 
(Kriesi:1995), but the degree to which each of these features matters compared to another is 
uncertain. Early theoretical work examined only empirical inputs to the political opportunity 
structure (such as Lipsky:1968), until Tilly (1978) and McAdam (1982) began to incorporate the 
non-empirical perception of threat as an input. Regimes that appear more susceptible to protest 
might then experience more protest. Other scholars have criticized political opportunity theory 
for its structural bias, arguing that it had a deterministic quality that left little room for 
constructive context (Bloom, 2015). On the other hand, Walder (2009) has critiqued the literature 
for being too movement-focused and not sufficiently considering the above structural variables, 
or for relying too much on a movement’s opposition to the state and not towards other, non-state 
actors. 
ICTs flatten geographic and ideological boundaries, insofar as they lower the risks and 
organizational costs for rebellious citizens to identify similarly minded individuals and facilitate 
protests antithetical to otherwise unaccountable authorities (Farrel, 2012; Melkote and Steeves, 
2015). Nevertheless, dictators have generally invested in broadband infrastructure for economic 
gain and public oversight (Stein, 2017).  Even the most reserved dictatorships, like Iran’s and 
North Korea’s, have not been able to halt the proliferation of ICTs within their borders. It may be 
that the regimes recognize the power to control their citizens in this way, or that the price paid by 
restricting this access in terms of unrest is too great, or that they have conceded they cannot 
control their population in this way (Stein, 2017). Rød and Weidmann (2015) empirically 
suggest that regimes aiming to prevent an independent public sphere are more likely to install 
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ICT technologies, but do not identify any significant correlation between internet access and 
political institutional strength or degree of democratic consolidation. We do not know how 
dictators choose to distribute internet services across a country’s social groups, or how politics 
drives provision; ethnic favoritism and fear of unrest may drive how national governments 
choose to supply internet access (Weidmann et al., 2016). 
Either way, the internet suggests a causal mechanism by which societies might liberalize 
and threaten autocratic rule. Dictators seeking to control information online need to reduce the 
information asymmetry between their regimes and dissidents; if a regime can accurately identify 
protest planners, police can prepare themselves accordingly, rather than resort to indiscriminate 
crackdowns (Wintrobe, 2005). While modern autocrats have many repressive ICTs at their 
disposal, kill-switches and censorship have dominated the scene in Egypt. Regulators can shut 
down parts of the internet in a restive region (Howard and Hussain, 2011; Kathuria, 2018). 
Alternatively, censorship can take the form of banning websites, jailing bloggers, and flagging 
provocative keywords (Deibert et al, 2011; Goldsmith and Wu, 2006). 
The digital media literature has also discussed the effects of the internet on activism. 
Internet connectivity has consequences for the populations involved in protests, the ways protest 
occurs, and even the targets of protest. The internet’s global character means new populations 
can be more informed about and more heavily invested in the affairs of far-away places. 
Cyberprotest has been lauded for enabling loosely knit organizations learn from each other 
across oceans and borders, mounting opposition against global trends, without having to organize 
themselves hierarchically and risk nullifying their individual aims (Aelst, 2009). Cyberactivists, 
however, have had mixed success in challenging authoritarians, given the latter’s capacity to 
filter and censor the former’s efforts. Scholarship analyzing the outcomes of the Arab Spring has 
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reached contradictory conclusions regarding whether information repression tools have increased 
or decreased the possibility for dissenters to mobilize. Stein (2014) and Breuer et al (2015), 
analyzing the “Twitter Revolution” in the Arab Spring, concluded that the potential for social 
media to “democratize dictatorships” remains uncertain (Stein, 1). There are many confounding 
variables, such as precisely how individuals use the internet under different conditions, that 
introduce challenges into such research. Steinert-Threlkeld (2017) has used machine-coded 
datasets of social media activity to draw a strong, positive, correlation between individual social 
media activity and offline protest levels the next day during the Egyptian Revolution. 
Repressive conditions may increase the costs of collective action because individuals 
have less autonomy to associate and cultivate trust. Furthermore, their knowledge of past 
instances of repression increases perceived costs. Finding oneself recipient to a visit by secret 
police may invoke the feeling that one has enemies and is constantly being observed by them. 
Being temporarily placed behind bars, or hearing of someone who has been, may reinforce 
perceived risks of losing one’s self-control, determination, and freedom. Moreover, mere 
suspicion of association with dissenting personalities may become grounds for intervention into 
one’s life. Autocratic supporters may cultivate a culture of loyalty to the regime that places 
chilling effects on contentious activity, making political confrontation antinormative and 
therefore less successful at changing the status quo, even without intentional repressive efforts by 
a state interested in self-preservation and unbound by adequate checks and balances on their 
power, (Stoycheff, 2018). Understanding that criticism can lead to these consequences, citizens 
may learn to avoid criticizing their governments. Repression may generate asymmetries of 
information by inclining dissidents to falsify their preferences for fear of retaliation, thereby 
challenging government supporters who would report levels of dissident upset (Wintrobe, 1990). 
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Pushed to the sidelines, dissident activity may become harder for the regime to anticipate. 
Alternatively, repression itself might invigorate further criticism and opposition, leading 
individuals to feeling justified in their views and sufficiently bold to challenge their state. 
The social movement and collective action literature address the effects of repressive 
environments. Stable and unstable political contexts condition contentious politics, and different 
political systems will process the same movements differently. Generally, weaker state 
apparatuses create more mobilization potential. Kriesi argues that the more centralized a state, 
the more the oppositional movement will seek to enact change at the highest level of politics 
(1995). To varying degrees, autocrats fear criticism, which, if propagated widely, can materialize 
into anti-regime protests and cascade across the state’s cities (Howard and Hussain, 2013). In 
authoritarian states, according to Wickham, “when a regime’s control over society weakens, the 
structural potential for mobilization perforce expands” (2005:6). When protests successfully 
occur, but the regime maintains strong domestic support, "a movement’s very success can lead to 
instances of counter-mobilization by its opponents, altering the environment in which the 
movement arose” (12). Generally, dictators must contend both with potentially rebellious 
populaces and other threatening factions (Bove, 2016). 
Finally, the mobilization literature analyzes the various inputs that increase or decrease 
mobilization levels in repressive environments, and discuss methods for measuring mobilization.  
Several early scholarly works examined mobilization through game-theory models focusing on 
varied inputs: Lichbach (1987) mapped the incentives of autocrats and dissidents, arguing that 
the latter substitute nonviolent and violent protest depending upon the state reaction; if protesters 
find their results lackluster, they change tactics. Gupta, Singh, and Sprague (1993) 
contextualized these incentives by claiming that repressive action increases mobilization in 
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democracies and decreases it in autocracies. More readily available and greater accountability 
procedures, they argue, intensify claims against repression. Rassler (1996) discussed the effect of 
timing; repression decreases dissent in the short run by massively increasing costs of continued 
action, but increases it in the long run by generating feelings of resentment.  
Moore (2000) aggregated these dynamics by examining the state responses to dissidents 
in sequential form. The state can either continue to repress, or grant the dissidents concessions; 
the two parties learn expectations over time. Shellman (2006a) investigated causal factors 
leading to government repression and cooperation, claiming that governments prefer cooperation 
when possible given lower short-run and long-run opponent, action, and audience costs. 
Opponents to the regime still want the support of a winning coalition, creating a dampening 
effect on violent interactions. The context of the decision-making matters because different 
levels of hostility and cooperativity for each group impacts the future distribution of disposition 
among the parties involved in the conflict. In another article, Shellman (2006b) argues that the 
quality of political institutions, economic status, and degree of ethnic fragmentation can intensify 
conflict; sequentially different state responses depend upon the relationships between the parties. 
The final corollary to these sequential inputs is that governments can enforce political order by 
anticipating challenger development. If authorities can identify specific mobilizational activities 
and systematically undermine them, they reduce repression costs. Mobilization, as an act, 
informs the future beliefs authorities create about the threats they make (Sullivan, 2015). Prior 
experience guides present expectations.  
But before we can even assess the independent variables affecting mobilization, we have 
to first be able to measure mobilization itself. Challenges in measuring mobilizational levels 
render further specification and analysis difficult. A general index for mobilization has not been 
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created, and discussions regarding what “mobilization” includes remains inconclusive. 
Intuitively, the number of protest participants offers an indicator for the degree of mobilization, 
but counting crowd numbers is famously difficult (Wang, 2017). Moreover, even if they were 
accurately counted, data collection by newspaper review suffers from descriptive and selection 
biases (Mueller,1997; Earl et al, 2004). Computerized media aggregators have somewhat 
mitigated these biases by drawing from the perspectives of multiple media sources 
simultaneously (Ruijgrok, 2017; Dollbaum, 2018). Other scholars measure the number of protest 
events in a given period. Widespread variation in attendance numbers between events implies a 
need to measure both, with a focus on accurately recording larger demonstrations (Biggs, 2018). 
Other scholars examine provincial level cross-sections to identify differences in mobilizational 
capacity. Escriba-Folch et al (2018), for example, demonstrate that worker remittances increase 
the resources available to potential political opponents in authoritarian regimes, but only in pro-
opposition provinces.  
Other scholars have applied modern technologies as mobilization proxies. Manacorda 
and Tesei (2016) empirically demonstrate that individuals are more responsive to degrading 
economic conditions and neighbor participation in protest actions when they have a cellphone. 
Furthermore, Shapiro and Weidman (2015) demonstrate that increased mobile communications 
reduce insurgent violence by lowering the costs of reporting dissident activity to security forces. 
The authors point to a sequential logic to explain the tradeoff reporters face between gaining 
rewards from the government for reporting action versus looking the other way and allowing the 
protests to intensify.  
I propose the following clarification: An event has a mobilizational potential relative to 
all possible protest events and relative to similar events (vandalizing a police cruiser occurs at a 
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different level than hundreds of demonstrators in a street). Actual mobilization serves as a 
function of the potential within this specific event relative to those like it. I argue that 
mobilization events that share a specific grievance or employ the same contentious political 
methods can be analyzed similarly (they share a specific grievance or make use of the same 
contentious political methods), but different models are necessary for assessing events of 






III: CONTRIBUTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Theoretical contributions:  
From the literature, we have learned that autocrats and activists can apply the same ICT 
tools towards polar political ends. The precise distribution of inputs and outputs partially 
explains technology’s effect for lowering or raising costs of all types. In the aggregate, we do not 
know who wins the strategic and tactical game over the effective deployment of these tools, nor 
can this paper conclusively determine outcomes. Every time a technological breakthrough 
surfaces, a new series of calculations must be undertaken to examine changes in the distribution 
of power, and each party faces incentives to innovate around the other. These cybernetic 
advances change not only the pieces on the board, but the rules of the board and the nature of the 
board itself. For that reason, a comprehensive theory-building exercise would be best suited to 
chronicling changes to the game over time and analyzing patterns therein.  
Moreover, the literature identifies a widely debated relationship between cyber-regulation 
and mobilization. Following from Diamond (2010), as well as Manacorda and Tesei (2016)’s 
work, do new communication tools revise political outcomes, or are they merely options for the 
same sequential repression and negotiation processes described by Moore (2000), Shellman 
(2006), Pierskalla (2013), and Sullivan (2015)? New digital tools and data collection practices 
facilitate novel contributions to these debates. Investigating the trajectory of increasingly 
repressive regime and its experience with protesters could yield insights into the role internet 
usage played over time. If that regime were to constrain cyberactivity and protest mobilization 
changed in the aftermath, causal claims regarding the effectiveness of that repressive effort could 
be addressed. To study Egypt’s experience under Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, the next section 
contributes to mobilization measurement discussions. 
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Egypt is an intrinsically important case (Gerring, 2006:41), insofar as the country’s 
experience with and since the 2011 Arab Uprisings, and the continual efforts by leaders Hosni 
Mubarak, Mohammed Morsi, and el-Sisi to regulate the country’s cyberspace, have been widely 
analyzed by academics and commented upon by civil society and media groups (Khalil, 2012; 
Ben-Hassine, 2018). For the same reasons, this case is data-rich; I review executive and 
legislative changes and media announcements, specifying and addressing tools Egypt applied to 
monitor and respond to domestic unrest. Egypt’s cyber-regulatory regime has become 
increasingly complex and constraining of user rights since 2010. More importantly, the case 
passes intuitive robustness checks. It is the consensus of civil society groups that el-Sisi has 
consolidated power over time. Surveys of thousands of Egyptians by Afrobarometer reveal a 
perception of narrowed opposition political space in the country (Afrobarometer, 2016). 
Protest mobilization can proxy for power consolidation. A dictator has many power 
consolidation methods at their disposal. Erdogan might pack the courts and Putin might bribe 
and blackmail the bureaucracy to personalize his control. We would expect mobilization levels to 
strongly correlate with this consolidation. Intuitively, autocrats aiming to increase the stability of 
their regime and extend their control over a country will take steps to undermine oppositional 
consciousness and foreclose protest opportunities. Repression suppresses mobilization levels, 
consolidating power. Given Egypt as a case, a study of how this power consolidation transpired 
is not mired by whether this power consolidation has transpired. Below, I describe the paper’s 
methodological study and the hypotheses it employs. Following, the paper’s methodology 
section describes my province-level mobilization coding, which charts protests under el-Sisi’s 




Should mobilizational potential condition our measurement of mobilization? Scholars often 
measure mobilization by the number of events and the number of protesters, but that assumes 
that every issue and event can draw similar numbers of protesters (Biggs, 2018). The specific 
context of a space, among other variables, affects mobilizational capacity; more densely 
populated spaces can better support protesters; a packed city square can motivate passersby, and 
there are fewer transportation costs associated with urban environments relative to rural land, 
which might only attract those intensely interested in the issue at hand. Given that mobilization 
stems from other conditions, like the grievance and repertoire of contention discussed in the 
literature review, including mobilizational potential in our models would make our 
measurements more precise and explanatory. Following, the paper presents two hypotheses and a 
methodology that event-grades protest episodes.  
Hypotheses: 
This paper investigates two hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Enhanced cyber-regulation decreases future mobilization. 
• el-Sisi passed several laws aiming at reducing government criticism online. One would 
expect, assuming the laws were effective at pursuing their intentions, that mobilization 
would decline proportionate to the amount that dissidents relied on those online tools to 
organize their offline demonstrations. If this hypothesis is supported, el-Sisi’s cyber-
regulations might have also aided his power consolidation, and the government’s efforts 
to control the internet may have a dampening effect on protest mobilization. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Police pressure at protest events decreases future mobilization. 
• By “pressure” I mean repressive acts such as violence against protesters, verbal threats, 
or the deployment of barricades. If this hypothesis is supported, the data inform the 
Garner 25 
 
conditions under which police effectively reduce dissent. Police presence could then be 
viewed, empirically, as a dampening effect on protest. 
Collected together, these hypotheses contribute to the literature by investigating and 
assessing plausible mechanisms by which autocrats could curtail protest mobilization and 
consolidate their rule. Following, I review the case studied to framework insights and pattern 





IV: CASE PROCESS TRACING 
Egypt’s cyber-regulatory regime has become increasingly complex and depriving of user 
rights since 2010. Internet kill-switches led to more resistance and were thus less effective 
compared to censors and regulatory revisions. These latter tools may have created chilling effects 
and increased the government’s ability to identify dissidents.  
Mubarak assumed the presidency in 1981 and established the National 
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (NTRA) in 2003. Regulating the internet 
telecommunication industry enables governments to invest in their citizenries’ internet 
connectivity, reaping the financial benefits of ecommerce, foreign direct investment, and digital 
scales of efficiency (Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, 2009). The 
NTRA succeeded in connecting many Egyptians to mobile telephony and substantially increased 
online activity throughout the country; Egypt’s early internet architecture developed similarly to 
that of Western powers, if not as quickly (International Telecommunications Union, 2018; Live 
Internet Stats, 2018). According to Freedom House, “the Egyptian government showed a relaxed 
attitude towards access to ICTs and did not censor websites or use high-end technologies to 
block online discussions” until 2010, although social media surveillance was not uncommon 
beforehand (2018a). Mubarak’s government had previously raided satellite television offices in 
Cairo and proposed formal digital censorship under Egyptian emergency law but was rebuffed 
by domestic civil society groups condemning the vague language he had suggested. Mubarak had 
sought to regulate any internet activity that “damaged national unity,” which critics claimed 
could implicate any critical message (Al Jazeera, 2008).  
The acuteness of the uprisings in 2010 and 2011, however, appear to have justified the 
NTRA’s encroachment upon internet rights in the minds of the governing bureaucracy. Egypt 
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witnessed an uptick in jailed bloggers and banned websites, many of which were affiliated with 
the Muslim Brotherhood (Freedom House, 2018b). Increasingly specific and widespread threats 
against the regime appeared to erode public opposition to digital repression. Anti-government 
hostilities perpetuated during the Arab Uprisings increased visible violence. While one could 
argue that street demonstrations across the Middle East distracted the public’s attention, and 
therefore opened the floodgates to any array of additional repressive methods, the data show 
increases in online crackdowns during the run-up to the Arab Uprisings later in 2010 (Howard 
and Hussain, 2011).  
As the unrest culminated in massive demonstrations in Tahrir Square on 25 January 2011, 
Mubarak infamously ordered the NTRA to disable the border gateway protocol routes 
connecting Egyptians to the wider internet, and to stall operations by domestic internet and 
mobile service providers (Richtell, 2011). In effect, Mubarak flipped the internet “kill-switch,” 
leaving protesters without internet access for three days.  
The motivations and ramifications of the act were mixed. Chiefly, Mubarak aimed to 
quell the uprisings by limiting protesters’ ability to organize and appear in unmanageable 
numbers simultaneously. Leaders of the April 6 Youth Movement and the Facebook page “We 
Are All Khalid Said” planned well-attended joint-demonstrations online (Wolman, 2011). 
Moreover, Mubarak sought to aggressively clamp down on the dissemination of critical 
viewpoints (Farrel, 2012; Shearlaw, 2016). Compared to the previous censorship regime, 
blocking internet traffic muzzled far more voices. Tufekci and Wilson (2012) have demonstrated 
that there were more protesters on the streets during the blackout than during the days before it. 
The authors suggested that fewer outlets for protest online, combined with the frustration of 
internet disruption, drew more citizens to the streets. Cyber-regulations, in this case, did not 
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dampen mobilization, it enflamed unrest. Meanwhile, many government officials were also left 
without internet connectivity (Glanz and Markoff, 2011). Normally, authorities monitored social 
media channels to identify and preempt protests. The rebels and authorities’ temporary reliance 
on traditional organizational methods left the latter unable to manage and preempt the former. 
After Mubarak’s 2011 resignation, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) 
maintained the president’s surveillance and opposition intimidation measures, citing persistent 
riots (Shearlaw, 2016). During and after the subsequent election, Egyptians regularly criticized 
Morsi’s Freedom and Justice Party for manipulating public opinion by elevating Muslim 
Brotherhood communications associates into state media companies, thereby offering them 
access to the tools used against them by the preceding regime two years prior (Aysha, 2012). 
Morsi met with Iranian officials to discuss exporting the latter’s repressive technologies to 
amplify the former’s “security and intelligence apparatus” (Tomlinson, 2013). While the meeting 
was high-profile, little came from it. Morsi’s presidency lasted only a year and was mired in 
election crises, ending in the coup d’état that brought el-Sisi to power (Bowen, 2014). Sustained 
domestic unrest and concern for the wider political landscape partially explain Morsi’s lack of 
innovation in Egypt’s repressive ICT regime, and the inability to apply the 2012 constitution to 
those ends. el-Sisi, having had more time, resources, and military support to control the 
population, has more effectively curtailed Egyptian internet rights, evidenced by the country’s 
continually declining “freedom of expression terms” from 3 to 6 over Freedom House’s 
“Freedom on the Net” index (Freedom House, 2018b). 
Despite international delegitimization amid widespread voter intimidation and boycotting 
by the military’s political opposition, the SCAF installed the 2014 constitution by national 
referendum and subsequently saw el-Sisi elected president. The new constitution provided a 
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fresh foundation upon which el-Sisi enhanced Egypt’s digital repression regime (El-Dabh, 2013; 
Bowen, 2014). Some scholars characterized the new constitution as less Islamist than its 2012 
counterpart and more authoritarian than the 1971 document (Grote, 2014; Carnegie Endowment, 
2014). Moreover, the new constitution referenced the internet in several ways pertinent to el-
Sisi’s agenda. It positions cyberspace as intrinsic to national security, justifying additional 
intervention even where normal anti-censorship provisions would take precedent. The document 
empowered the Egyptian parliament to require approval for online media companies to operate, 
and Article 211 facilitated the creation of the Supreme Council for the Administration of the 
Media (SCAM), endowed with sweeping regulatory powers (Constitute Project, 2014). Since the 
constitution’s ratification, el-Sisi has signed into law new bills threatening incarceration for 
visiting websites deemed libelous and permitting the screening of celebrity social media posts 
(DW, 2018; British Broadcasting Corporation, 2018). 
On 1 August 2015, el-Sisi signed into law a counterterrorism bill that, among other 
restrictions, “grants the prosecution authority in the investigation of a terrorist crime to monitor, 
record, and film conversations and acts in private spaces, online, and via telephone” (el-Sadany, 
2015). The Egyptian Constitution’s broad and vague definition of terrorism enables prosecutors 
to designate suspects and thereby study them without much bureaucratic resistance. Coupled 
with revelations a month earlier that the Egyptian government had invested heavily in a Western 
cybersecurity partner to import spyware technologies for domestic surveillance, the potential for 
government actors to study oppositional forces increased (Currier and Marquis-Boire, 2015) 
On 26 December 2016, these regulatory revisions culminated in an official review 
process for new companies and the regular examination of current ones. Instead of simply 
banning websites, which had incited domestic condemnation and protest, SCAM’s permissions 
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and sophistication have resulted in a censorship regime that moderates online conversation 
(Saliba, 2017). A punitive system of fines and imprisonment terms encourages journalists to self-
censor, creating chilling effects that limit the spread of oppositional viewpoints. Most recently, 
el-Sisi has weaponized the government’s internet disruption capacities to block communications 
in the Sinai Peninsula, aiming to thwart the tactical organization of Islamist militants in the 
region (Khattab,2018. 
Over time, the government has reduced the degree of information asymmetry between its 
political and domestic opposition and itself. Internet kill-switches were less effective, compared 
to regulatory revisions and censors. While the former amplified resistance and decreased the 
government’s knowledge of its opponents, the latter has made it easier for the regime to identify 
and deter dissident activity.  By these latter methods, and the framework the 2014 constitution 
provides, el-Sisi’s regime appears to have increasingly curtailed domestic threats without inciting 




V: METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION 
The paper process traces an independent case study and conducts time-series analyses of 
its findings. Past researchers have studied mobilization and have contributed facts about how and 
why people mobilize. Recently, scholars have taken to sequential logic to identify precisely how 
a dissident or government actor would immediately respond to an action by the other. I have 
found little academic work relating actual to potential mobilization. The paper contributes to the 
literature by addressing the relationship between these two concepts.  
I draw from several different ways of measuring collective action processes to assess 
potential and actual mobilization over time within Egypt. First, I create an ordinal variable and 
apply it by scoring protest incidences listed in the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data 
Project (ACLED) dataset for Egypt from 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2018 inclusive 
(Raleigh et al, 2011). The ACLED dataset has been widely used by researchers of conflict in 
Africa, and South Asia to analyze day-to-day violence patterns (Sangnier and Zylberberg, 2016). 
Applying my variable to ACLED’s dataset, it compares how much mobilization occurred in one 
instance to the level of mobilization in other  instances that share fundamental characteristics.  
ACLED collects timestamped and spatially coordinated datasets on dozens of countries 
over the past decade. Critically, ACLED substantiates its event codes with newswire sources that 
often assess the number of protesters and their reasons for protesting. As discussed in the 
literature review, this is the best-case methodology for studying protests day-to-day (short of 
fieldwork) because it aggregates the information of multiple media sources to mediate selection 
and content biases. I contribute to this dataset by triangulating additional evidence for the protest 
in question before scoring the event in terms of its mobilization level. Specifically, I examine 
each of 535 individual protest events through these dates. ACLED describes each event collected 
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via newswire from various agencies. I ran each event through Factiva, a newspaper aggregator 
run by Dow Jones, to further research each protest in search of information that would assist 
event coding, as described in the thesis’s codebook. 
Afterwards, to determine cyber-regulation’s effect on protest mobilization, the paper 
charts the evolution of el-Sisi’s power consolidation and Egypt’s cyber-regulatory regime 
(including the passage of legislative bills, creation, revision, and empowerment of regulatory 
agencies, and executive orders), starting with Mubarak’s regime in 2010. To perform this task, 
the paper identifies and evaluates patterns in the cyber-regulatory timeline by reviewing relevant 
cyberlaws passed by the Parliament of Egypt, increased perceived digital repression as reported 
by Freedom House’s “Freedom on the Net” indicators, and performs a statistical impact 
assessment of these regulations for protest mobilization. 
The paper creates an ordinal measure that assesses 1) the potential mobilization for a 
protest event and 2) the actual witnessed mobilization level, serving as a function of its potential. 
I assigned each of 535 events both a potential and an actual score, evaluated as “low,” 
“medium,” or “high.” This spectrum comprises the paper’s dependent variable. To a degree, 
these functions are intuitive. A protest that maximized its potential could be indicated by its 
aftermath: the paper would refer to the toppling of a regime, with thousands of protesters in the 
streets of multiple cities. Tunisia’s experience with the Arab Spring is “high.” At the other end of 
the spectrum, some protested online act might not have merited any significant offline action. 
ACLED does not capture these small-scale events, and they are excluded from my dataset. For 
these reasons, the paper considers mobilizational output measured both in the scale of the 
mobilizational potential, and in the scale of the actual mobilization experienced.  
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The justifications, goals, and repertoire of contention protesters employ depend upon the 
circumstances they face; qualitatively different issues are difficult to compare. How could one 
relate the effectiveness of a protest calling for equal rights for LGBT+ populations in Uganda 
with anti-censorship protests in China? For this reason, the paper analyzes only protests geared 
towards opposition to the regime (that is to say, the removal of the regime OR merely in 
opposition to the regime’s stated policies). Anti-regime protesters may oppose the regime and 
seek to revise the domestic sphere for a variety of reasons, making this protest type the most 
widely accessible, and therefore the most qualitatively useful to the study at hand. Demanding a 
democratic government is a key, common example of an anti-regime protest studied by this 
paper, but other anti-regime protests, such as those launched against specific policies like the 
concession of the Sanafir and Tiran islands to Saudi Arabia or those in direct support of Morsi, 
were also included. Protests and riots not anti-regime in character were excluded from the 
dataset. 
The above methodology, properly employed, enables the paper to chart a changing level 
of mobilization over time within a country. As the paper studies repressive conditions, a scope 
condition is that the states to be studied were “not free” by Freedom House’s designation. 
Furthermore, Freedom House’s “Freedom on the Net” indicators deliver an indexed evaluation 
of a country’s internet conditions relative to other states. These states employ the generally 
expected repressive internet features, like censorship, filtering, and surveillance technologies. I 
did not select China as a case. The relative opacity and sophistication of China’s regulatory 
regime requires far more extensive analysis than can be conducted here. 
 
 
Data Collection Procedures: 
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ACLED collects protest data for the cases studied but does not measure protest 
mobilization. Protest mobilization is a necessary variable for assessing the efficacy of different 
cyberregulatory regimes and the conditions under which activists may overcome them. I examine 
anti-regime protests between January 1, 2014 and December 31, 2017. ACLED has full data for 
these dates for all cases. Expanding the selection further would require more coding time than I 
could allocate. Therefore, I exclude data points not meeting these parameters from the study. The 
remaining ACLED protest data points are graded into ordinal mobilizational categories. A “low-
level” mobilization event is less mobilized than a “medium-level” or “high-level” event. Each 
measure is a function of the mobilizational potential for protests of a similar size and grievance. 
At the end of the paper, I detail data categories in a codebook.  
Often, ACLED reports a number specific to the protest. Alternatively, ACLED or the 
media will characterize the event as “minor clashes,” evidencing a small turnout relative to the 
reporter’s intuition. Moreover, ACLED measures the scale of the media source (local, national, 
international) that reported the protest. Mobilization assessment must also consider the number 
of protesters in relation to the municipality in which the protest took place. A demonstration 
featuring a dozen denizens of Dhaka is far less significant than one of the same size in a remote 
Siberian village that barely sustains 2000 annual inhabitants. Moreover, the potential for protest 
mobilization within countries differs due to country-specific factors, including legal atmosphere, 
population demographics, and history. This fact challenges comparative analysis and justifies 
deeper process tracing in a single case to overcome potential exogeneity problems in the research 
design. Narrowing the focus to Egypt, the paper aims to mitigate socio-cultural specific factors 
that, discussed in the literature review, might confound results.  
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What justifies graduation from “weak mobilization” to “moderate” or “strong 
mobilization?” Answering this question is a significant contribution to the measurement 
methodology of mobilization, as discussed in earlier sections. I consider the population of the 
municipality that hosted the protest, and measure all events at the district level. Egypt is divided 
into 27 governorates, which are further subdivided into districts. ACLED codes each secondary-
level district in which a protest took place. Egypt codes these districts by population density. A 
markaz (زكرم), “center” is more rural, wider in land area, and less populated than an urban, 
narrow, and densely populated kism (مسق), “department” (Egypt Census, 2016). As ACLED does 
not code this distinction, nor population numbers per district, I assign a population and density 
score to each district to more accurately code mobilization. I was unable to more concretely 
determine what specific feature Egyptian census-takers use to determine how and where these 
designations and demarcations are made, but each geographic space boasts historical 
significance. 
ACLED tracks the actors associated with each event and designates them an “interaction” 
based upon their incentives. The project assigns “Governments and State Security Services” a 
“1,” “Rebels” a “2,” “Political Militia” a “3,” “Ethnic Militia” a “4,” “Rioters” a “5,” and 
“Protesters” a “6.” ACLED then tracks “interactions.” When an event comprises two actors, 
ACLED concatenates the individual codes for the event based on the actors involved, marking a 
zero if the event only comprised one actor. An event pitting police and rioters nets a 1,5. A 6,0 
designates protesters who do not interact with police forces or any other party. This paper is 
concerned with evaluating events designated as 1,5; 1,6; 5,0; and 6,0. ACLED also records data 
on political militia and organized dissident groups. While these entities are of great interest to 
future study, they fall outside of the scope of this paper insofar as they rarely rely upon activists 
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to mobilize, and instead upon hierarchic leadership. I further detail this coding decision in the 
paper’s discussion section. 
Finally, ACLED independently scores the level of media source scored from “local” to 
“international.” Intuitively, one would think that events receiving more coverage from further 
away indicate the relatively higher degree of salience to public conversation, and thus hold a 
higher mobilizational potential compared to events only covered locally. Reports the regime 
considers more threatening to its legitimacy are more likely to be censored locally. The paper 
identifies key media companies from each case and searches through their websites, counting the 
number of times that the protest appeared over 240 hours following the event to assess the degree 





VI: DATA ANALYSIS 
Data Analysis Procedures: 
I use Stata’s statistics software tools to analyze the coded data. First, I generated a shaded 
line graph to visualize changing a) actual mobilization and b) potential mobilization for all 
events over the four years studied, with time (days) plotted on the x-axis and both potential and 
actual mobilization, the ordinal dependent variable, on the y-axis. As discussed, the downward 
trend of both lines over time reflects el-Sisi’s consolidation of power. Moreover, I identify 
varying rates of change (slopes) over the time-series to examine outlier dates or periods in which 
mobilization sharply decreased or increased relative to general trends. One may also break the 
data down to the grievance-specific level, per interaction type, or exclude small-scale protests for 
separate visualizations, further analysis, and the assessment of the below hypotheses mentioned 
previously. 
I conduct an impact assessment to determine how effectively el-Sisi’s cyberregulatory 
regime has suppressed Egyptian protest mobilization levels. Multiple Interrupted Time Series 
(MITS) analysis enables effective study of these data because it tests the descriptive data 
comparatively given date inputs: the period following a cyber-regulation can be compared, for 
the significance of any variable, with a period before the regulation (Wood, 1988). Using linear 
regressions, I can assess how well these policies and grievance specifications (independent 
variables) predict changes in the six different mobilization metrics the paper has proposed, and, 
moreover, which variables have the most significant effect (positive or negative) for that change.  
I sort the events by date and run count-if functions to aggregate data by day. Journalists 
normally report protest events on a day-by-day basis, particularly in this case. Days are therefore 
the smallest unit of data suitable for analysis, offering the most granular approach for studying 
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changes in mobilization values over time. To that end, I run six different ordinary least squares 
regression models (potential and actual; low, medium, and high), to assess the levels of 
mobilization at different periods in which the Parliament of Egypt codified new legislation. 
Given ACLED protest data ranging from 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2018, the timeline 
events most significant for impact assessment are (1) the 1 August 2015 Antiterrorism Bill and 
(2) the 26 December 2016 establishment of the new media regulation agency, each in terms of 
the press coverage and the sophistication of the repressive measures they permit relative to other 
legislation. 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Enhanced cyber-regulation decreases mobilization. 
Falsification: If el-Sisi’s cyberregulatory regime cannot be shown to decrease mobilization.  
Test: Is there a statistically significant rate of change of mobilizational decline following the 
implementation of key cyberlaws compared to the standard decline? Does controlling for 
grievance yield different results? I create a lag variable to determine if mobilization count in one 






















0.045** 0.069 0.700 0.568 0.309 0.440 0.612 
(-0.109) (-0.129) (0.010) (0.215) (-0.026) (-0.012) (6.294) 
Policy 2 
0.027** 0.097 0.331 0.790 0.104 0.108 0.185 
(-0.106) (-0.098) (0.021) (0.008) (-0.026) (-0.022) (19.574) 
Pro-
Islamism 
0.0*** 0.0*** 0.013* 0.130 0.334 0.360 0.005*** 
(0.803) (0.954) (0.287) (0.154) (0.043) (0.031) (107.953) 
Pro-
Morsi 
0.0*** 0.734 0.469 0.033 0.763 0.340 0.010** 
(0.826) (0.055) (0.136_ (0.695) (0.015) (0.220) (149.466) 
Anti-
Military 
0.0*** 0.018** 0.0*** 0.001*** 0.047* 0.403 0.0*** 
0.520 (0.384) (0.366) (0.579) (0.093) (0.013) (146.184) 
Anti-
Policy 
0.0*** 0.0*** 0.034* 0.062 0.343 0.031* 0.0*** 
(0.876) (0.875) (0.114) (0.245) (0.013) (0.027) (135.378) 
Lag 
0.294 0.313 0.376 0.836 0.057 0.071  
(0.0345) (0.067) (0.079) (0.005) (-0.022) (-0.035)  
Constant 
0.006*** 0.041* 0.070 0.295 0.192 0.061 0.492 
(0.126) (0.116) (-0.042) (0.005) (0.021) (0.026) (-7.016) 
R2 0.8333 0.669 0.4573 0.519 0.138 0.180 0.276 
N 1,460 1,460 1,460 1,460 1,460 1,460 1,461 
This table reports p-values and coefficients (in parentheses). Significant at ***99% level, **95% level, 






I group the results for potential and actual models for low mobilization separately from 
the other four models. 
Both low-mobilizational results are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level 
for rejecting the null. My model explains nearly 67% of the variation in the data studied, 
including specific grievances. Given the high p-value for the lag variable, it seems unlikely that, 
for both models, mobilization yesterday affects mobilization today. Compared to the potential 
model, the variables have less explanatory power for the actual mobilization model. Moreover, 
we cannot reject the null for the pro-Morsi and policy indicators in the actual low-mobilization 
model. 
I then run a correlation between the per-day anticipated counts for each mobilizational 
model and the results of the regression. 
Table 2. Correlated per-day anticipated counts for low mobilizational models and regression output. 




N 1,460 1,460 
I find a strong, positive relationship between the predicted values from the regressions 
and my models’ actual values. These results imply that the policies had effect for low-
mobilization protest activity, and that overtime the measurement sustains little residue from the 
trendline: few results do not conform to the modeled mobilizational decline. Exceptions remain: 
we cannot reject the null that the policies have no effect on actual low levels. I interpret these 
findings to mean that the policies seem to limit the prevalence of small-scale events but have no 
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discernable impact on the numbers of individuals who protest or the resources they expend in 
doing so: over time on a given day, we are relatively less likely to see two dozen people 
demonstrating outside of a government office, but neither more nor less likely to see those two 
dozen take part in a riot comprising hundreds. The pro-Morsi grievance indicator becomes 
statistically insignificant. This result may stem from the declining prevalence of pro-Morsi 
protests (as time between Morsi’s deposition and the data expands) before the policies were 
enacted. Finally, the two policies have nearly identical (and negative) coefficients relative to the 
constant. This finding appears to indicate that policies had roughly similar effects for 
mobilizational decline: The number of low-potential mobilization observations drops by 10%, on 
average, compared to when the first policy was not in effect, and by another 10% when policy 2 
came into effect. 
 
Impact Assessment Robustness: 
A statistical error is the amount by which an observation differs from its expected value. 
In time series analysis, one might fear a strong correlation between the errors for each data point. 
Such serial correlation in the error terms reduce the degree of accuracy in a regression’s 
estimations of the actual description of the phenomenon under study (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 
1991). P-values would appear lower than they are in reality, and researchers would reject nulls 
when they should not. Given the difficult of calculating precise outcomes in the social sciences, 
my model can be improved by testing for correlations in the seemingly random variations 
affecting measurements of each event (namely, unit roots). In this case, it is particularly 
important for identifying unanticipated patterns given the wide literature on individual 
motivations and resources necessary to protest in different environments. By running a Dickey-
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Fuller test, one can determine if data display such a pattern (Dickey and Fuller, 1976). The 
results of the test were “clean” insofar as I can reject the null hypothesis (that a unit root exists in 
the data) with a p-value below .05. 
 
Medium and High-Mobilizational Output: 
The medium and high-mobilization models, however, do not share the significance of the low-
mobilization models.  
How should we interpret the policy effects’ statistical insignificance for higher 
mobilization-event levels? The policies appear to curtail low-level potential mobilization to a 
high degree, but do not affect other event-types. Investigating the nuances of the polices could 
explain these disproportionate impacts. Further qualitative analysis follows in the paper’s 
discussion section.  
 
Measurement Robustness: 
Departing from testing the above hypothesis, I also examine the effectiveness of my 
models themselves compared to the literature’s method for measuring mobilization. Given data 
available, scholars aim to assess the total number of protesters per day, granularly by region or 
throughout the country (see Dollbaum, 2016; or Rosenfeld, 2006 for examples). How could I 
evaluate the explanatory power of my measure versus that of other measures? Given the same 
dataset, one can compare different models for their capacity to best-fit the data. The higher the 
R2 value, the better the model explains the variance in the sample. I compare the R2 value of my 
models versus the traditional measure. If my models are as explanatory or less than the 
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literature’s, I interpret that the models do not offer substantive contribution on their own. If the 
models are more explanatory, they might lead to more descriptive analyses of protest patterns. 
According to the above data, using the number of protesters to understand the impact of 
these policies is not very effective. Because protest numbers can change dramatically from day 
to day, they make an ineffective proxy for mobilization on their own (Biggs, 2018). If the 
regression controls for grievance, the model becomes more explanatory. 
Switching the totalprotester variable for the mobilization score and keeping all else equal, 
the low and medium potential and actual models boast superior R2 values and stronger 
correlations with expected results. The high potential and actual offer less explanatory power 
than the above regression for this dataset. As mobilization scores increase, more protesters line 
the streets. There are far fewer high-level than low-level events for this dataset and generally, 
given that compared to the efforts of small-scale events, mobilizing large numbers of individuals 
is logistically challenging and resource-intensive. For these reasons, one would expect measuring 
the total number of protesters to have the greatest explanatory power when measuring high-
mobilization events. Likewise, according to these results, this paper’s metric delivers the greatest 
contribution to the literature in terms of its explanatory power for small and medium-level 
mobilization-types. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Police pressure decreases future mobilization. 
Falsification: No significant correlation between police interaction and mobilizational decline. 
Test: Identify the proportionate concentration of ACLED-coded interactions on a per-week basis. 
1,5 (police and rioters) and 1,6 interactions (police and protesters) versus 5,0 (rioters only) and 
6,0 (protesters only). I refer to this calculation as the “repression rate” because it captures the 
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percentage of events in which police engaged protesters. I expect increased repression results in 
less mobilization in following weeks (I lag the indicator by one week, given the expectation that 
it will take at least this long for dampening effects to appear). I then determine whether that 
decline or uptick in active repression (the repression rate) correlates with the decrease in 
mobilization over time, as measured by the previous six mobilization functions. I add pro-
Islamism as a variable because it presents an “easy-case.” One would expect the Egyptian 
government most-likely to clamp down on Muslim Brotherhood members compared to other 
dissident groups. If the findings are not determinable for this group, it would seem unlikely that 
clear results would be found more broadly or with other group variables inputted into the 
regression. 
From the first hypothesis’s findings, we could not determine a clear effect of repression 
one day for a decline in mobilization in the next. Given a week, we might expect more time for 
word-of-mouth of a repression event to reach others and raise their knowledge of the costs of 
contentious action, thereby deterring protest. Given a more precise dataset on specific instances 
of police pressure, we might clear a more statistically significant relationship. From the 
displayed data, however, it appears that even with the week-lag, there is no statistically 
significant relationship between this repression measurement and low-level mobilization to 
analyze. To little surprise, there is a statistically significant relationship between pro-Islamic 






Hypothesis 1 (H1): Enhanced cyber-regulation decreases mobilization. 
The policies appear to curtail low-level potential mobilization to some degree, but do not 
affect other event-types. What intervening causal mechanisms could explain these results? 
Investigating the specific contributions of the policies assists in describing their effects. The first 
policy studied in the impact assessment includes monitoring and censoring of individuals. The 
second policy established and executed a sophisticated regulatory framework for Egyptian media 
companies.  
Chilling effects, as described in the literature review, support both of these policy 
advancements. Fear of observation would deter individuals from seeking out dissident 
information or organizing forums online, or for media groups to disseminate such information in 
the first place without layering it in coded messaging. Moreover, news publications discussing 
the polices may have aided in a chilling effect: if the polices were not actually implemented, but 
Egyptians thought the policies were implemented, there may have still been a decline in small-
scale protest due to increases in the perceived risk of action. It stands to reason that real chilling 
effects would transpire over small-scale, digital actions like tweeting negatively about the 
regime. Recent empirical work by Stoycheff et al. (2018) used surveys to document a statistically 
significant effect for likelihood to perform illegal activities like pirating movies after learning 
about mass surveillance practices, but it does not consider the staying effect of such policies. 
Further research that considers similar cyberregulatory polices in other environments, 
particularly where there is a delay in actual policy rollout, would support studies of the chilling 
effect’s magnitude.  
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Second, the implementation of each policy had real regulatory effects for Egyptian 
cyberspace, both in terms of restraints to the internet architecture and in the content one can find 
on its websites. It is likely that the policies had real effects for low-level potential mobilization. 
These policies facilitate direct action by law enforcement officers to restrain activists hoping to 
launch small-scale demonstrations. They ease IP address tracing and circumvention of proxy 
services. This mechanism is consistent with the increasing number of jailed bloggers throughout 
Egypt (Freedom House, 2018). The accelerating rate of website-banning for failures to comply 
with new regulations further limits information that might motivate action or serve to organize 
actors (Access Now, 2018). 
 The policies, however, appear to have no effect for the other models. In other words, the 
cyberregulations’ effects, however marginal, are concentrated in low-level mobilization events to 
the exclusion of higher-scale protests. These results seem consistent with the above 
understanding of the regulations’ effect on Egyptian cyberspace. When activists or other leaders 
pursue more ambitious political actions, like organizing industrial strikes or protest-parades 
across multiple cities, much more effort and energy must be expended. Such events certainly 
took place before the internet became mainstream in the 1990s. I argue that the higher 
investment costs for orchestrating high-scale mobilization require significant offline action, 
which could be accomplished with or without social media. The utility of the internet for 
lowering the costs of collective action, according to these results, rests in facilitating “cheap” 
protest demonstrations. Organizers who could have planned protests offline more easily manage 
them online, and “flash” events absent organizers can find spontaneous excitement that nudges 
small performances, like vandalism, in reaction to messages critical of the government. The 
marginal benefit for using these tools seem increasingly insignificant as mobilization costs 
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increase. Once the mobilization costs (in terms of monetary and material resources, as well as 
recruits) reaches a threshold, digital tools may begin to pale in their significance comparative to 
other mechanisms for explaining collective action like word-of-mouth or printed fliers. The 
dimensions of this threshold require further process tracing to analyze, but likely include the 
intensity of feeling protesters feel about an issue (such as per the grievance justifying action), 
which increases their risk tolerance (Ciorciari and Weiss, 2016; Heath and O’Hair, 2010). The 
effect of curtailing the digital tools of regime opponents, via chilling effects and regulations, 
would reduce the potential for small-scale events but decrease in its salience as those tools 
become less pertinent given the increased intensity of other variables. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Police pressure decreases future mobilization. 
The regression failed to identify a statistically significant relationship between this 
repression measurement and mobilization levels. Data where police were not present was 
excluded from this test, lowering the number of observations significantly, which may reduce the 
paper’s ability to assess the claim. Evidence suggests, however, that repression does not correlate 
with mobilization in this way, given the statistical insignificance of the lag variables for both this 
hypothesis and H1. The data studied by this regression was not aggregated at the location-level. 
From the results, it seems unlikely that a police-protester interaction in Cairo affects future 
interactions in Alexandria or Aswan. The number of observations per region is too small to 
determine if proximity changes the result. Further research seeking to clarify the effects of police 






This section reviews findings not directly related to the hypotheses that were uncovered 
during case research. 
In the Egyptian case, dissidents shifted the focus of their protests to narrower policy 
problems over time. The precise reasons for this trend remain unclear. First, it may be that 
Egyptians grow exhausted, recognizing that broad-based goals like sweeping regime removal of 
the military executive are impracticable. Second, it may be that the regime, becoming more 
consolidated over time, develops a disproportionate capacity to quell broad-based protests. Both 
may also work in combination. If the latter is true, dissidents face incentive to work through 
official channels to deliver critical feedback on the regime’s activities and to press narrower 
claims when they do protest. Plausibly, authoritarian regimes better constrain low-mobilizational 
activities once it has a greater capacity to police areas where small-scale dissident activity is 
common. Authorities would find it easier to deter low-level acts premised on wide-reaching 
ideological claims. More specific and formally designed claims, by contrast, may lead to protest 
events of a higher mobilizational capacity because of a self-selection effect among dissident 
activists. Protesters in these settings may have greater knowledge of the policy they are 
proposing, and therefore feel more confident in their pursuit of the policy, and achieve a higher 
level of mobilization despite the government’s consolidation of power. A larger dataset of protest 
events more narrowly coded by grievance would lead more conclusive insights into this 
hypothetical. Certainly, protest is exhausting of energy and material resources. Protesters may 
simply have, in the Egyptian case, found the fight no longer worth it.  
 Alternatively, protests becoming more focused policy issues might indicate increasing 
acceptance of the regime, or at least increased resignation on the part of dissidents that more 
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could be accomplished. If these narrower issues are not as capable of mobilizing support as 
wider frustrations, then the overall potential for protest would decline, indicating a consolidation 
of power. These mechanisms may work in tandem. Increased regime consolidation incentivizes 
activists to narrow their goals, which in turn reduces broad-based activity, thereby reducing the 
resource-pressures on local police units and enabling authorities to expend their energies 
consolidating power by addressing other crimes. 
Per the dozen media agency newswire collections I reviewed, few protest events listed 
more than one organization acting in the protest. Only eight of 535 protests, or 1.5%, appear to 
have been reported as including multiple anti-governmental groups, and of them, the total 
number of groups never exceeded 3. What explains this finding? At first glance, this outcome 
seems consistent with the collective action literature. More parties and interests create greater 
logistical challenges. If el-Sisi’s repression regime has had a chilling effect on small-scale 
mobilization, then it might have also succeeded in dissuading groups from working together by 
increasing communication costs. Given the relatively small sample size this paper studies, and 
the few such events it identified, I could not statistically evaluate this potential chilling effect.  
Separately, this finding might reflect little actual collusion between different anti-governmental 
groups. Having different goals in mind, leaders might determine that their political aims are zero-
sum. They would then seek to avoid including potential rivals, who might attempt to effect 
governmental change in ways contrary to the leaders’ and movement’s aspirations. This finding 
might also reflect that many rebellious political goals are incompatible: secularism and Islamism, 
for example, begin with conflicting assumptions about how governance ought to function. 
Moreover, narrower policy goals probably do not facilitate broader-based groups working 
together. Individual supporters of these movements are less likely to find common-meaning if 
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they were to protest collectively. Of the few instances where more than one group protested 
together, all of the groups were pro-Islamist. The Muslim Brotherhood leads the Anti-Coup 
Alliance, whose member list has declined steadily since 2014 in the wake of government outlaw 
(Muslim Brotherhood, 2016). Finally, this finding might result from poor data capture by 
newswires. If none of the newswires listed colluding protest groups, one might claim that the 
newswires were not an effective information source for this data. That sometimes the newswires 
did illustrate the presence of secondary groups, however, indicates that were likely few events in 
which reporters saw the presence and impact of other protest groups significant. 
I do not have data on the individuals involved in each protest. Were certain types of 
people more likely to be energetic and enthusiastic for certain grievance areas, and how does that 
person’s geographic origin matter for these effects? While my methodology goes to great lengths 
to minimize and categorize the different criteria people use to justify their political action, 
protesting has an indisputably individualistic component that is difficult to quantitatively assess 
without invested field work. There is not, for example, an easily identifiable relationship between 
the groups protesting and the evolution of policy goals. The Muslim Brotherhood always protests 
events pertaining to the Muslim Brotherhood’s goals. In-person interviews of members of 
specific groups would deliver insights into how the group’s policy demands have changed on a 
granular level not captured by this methodology’s macro-level approach. 
Moreover, it is likely that in many cases individuals protested atomistically, rather than as 
part of a larger group, which would challenge efforts to report or code the activity and 
prevalence of larger groups. Scholars require another measurement to determine to what degree 
protesters associate themselves with specific groups and dedicate great time to a cause, or merely 
engage the protesting process passively. It is difficult to determine if someone protesting with 
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Greenpeace believes in the organization’s most extreme positions, or merely views a discrete 
protest event as an opportunity to support environmental reform. Conventional wisdom views 
mobilization efforts as contingent: past repression impacts the next iteration of protests. Given 
the above conditions and the failed results of this paper’s second hypothesis, it would seem that 
protesters cite critical events from the past repeatedly rather than respond directly to recent 
events. Rarely during data collection did I observe protest justifications that described an event 
from the week before; most justifications referred to significant happenings, like Morsi’s ousting 
or the cession of Sanafir Island to Saudi Arabia. 
Aiming to address potential atomization, I noted the number of arrests newswires 
reported during data collection. Professional police forces normally register exactly how many 
protesters they arrest and process. While police document these facts to inform judges and 
attorneys later in criminal justice procedure, this data, reported by journalists, is a much more 
precise measure than crowd estimates. Seeking to determine if arrests might proxy for protest 
numbers, I ran a separate correlation between the two values for each event. If we could assume 
that the more arrested, the more protested, we could arrive at a better approximation of protest 
numbers, and therefore better conduct more accurate statistical assessments.  
While there appears to be a strong, statistically significant relationship in the results, 
many events were excluded from the data because no arrests were cited, leading to a potential 
false negative error. Other variables, such as the order and significance of events and violence at 
the protest likely explain arrests more than protester turnout, given police’s incentive to keep the 
peace. Deeper process tracing of a few events selected at random would enable a more robust 
assessment of arrests as a proxy for protest numbers. 
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Dollbaum and other researchers have sought to make protester number measurements 
more effective by controlling for the number of protest attendees per political group (2016:3), 
but aggregation of this type does not permit r2 comparisons because it does not assess discrete 
events. Further research to assess the relative explanatory power of this paper’s models would 
apply the metric to the same dataset over the same groups to enable more effective comparisons. 
Additionally, there are many other Egyptian cyber-regulation policies this paper did not assess. 
Investigating them would have complicated the paper’s mobilization models, but would have 
added more explanatory power because then we could process trace what aspects of each policies 
have the highest significance for mobilizational change. 
 
Limitations and Future Research Direction: 
These findings suffer from several weaknesses. Critically, the laws studied here regulated 
many polices not directly related to ICTs: the impact assessment studies the policy as a proxy for 
internet control, rather than internet control directly. Policies that improve legal protections for 
police officers might embolden repressive acts, but do not directly contribute to internet effects. 
Further process tracing that uncovered precise regulatory changes would make the analysis more 
accurate, but internet outcomes for politics can hardly be studied in a vacuum.  
Mobilization, as discussed in the literature review, could be modeled in many ways. This 
paper’s methodological contribution limits mobilization to protests and riots. It does not discuss 
militia groups or other organizations with mobilizational capacity. Close-knit, hierarchical 
organizations draw on their members, rather than on the masses, to act. Different measurement 
criteria may be necessary for accurately reviewing these groups with the same methodology. 
Various resources, for example, might be more or less useful to certain groups. It may be that 
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militia are relatively more reliant than protesters upon firearms for achieving high mobilization 
levels. These considerations would be reflected in a more broadly reaching codebook. 
Moreover, much of my analysis rests under the claim that consolidation of power and 
mobilization are strongly correlated. Without a clear metric for the former, my findings remain 
speculative. How could scholars create a clearer metric for power consolidation? Certainly, the 
capacity for opposition to mobilize should play a part in reflecting how effectively a regime has 
consolidated their position. The World Bank’s political stability index could serve as another 
proxy (World Bank, 2019). This index covers a wide range of social science indicators on a 
country’s economic conditions, ethno-political relationships, and bureaucratic independence. 
Integrating this metric into wider measures of “social unrest” might increase the measurement’s 
applicability outside of the case discussed here. Finally, the paper only studied anti-regime 
protests; other, non-government grievances likely mobilize less than government ones given 
fewer potential stakeholders, but these events are nonetheless important to study. 
RIPE’s Network Coordination Centre maintains data on internet activity across countries 
over the past twenty years, which could test for spuriousness in the paper’s statistical results. 
RIPE is the Regional Internet Registry (RIR) for Eurasia. It is also the data repository for all 
RIRs (including Africa’s, namely, AFRINC). It measures the number of website prefixes 
registered to a country and its number of Autonomous Systems (ASNs), the domestic “networks” 
that comprise the internet. Having fewer networks would imply a less sophisticated national 
network. Both measures generally increase steadily over time as the internet develops. Given that 
RIPE maintains data for the same time series, proper application could determine if protests 




Finally, this paper’s research remains limited to a single country. When theory-building, 
one aims to generalize as much as possible without losing accuracy. If the mobilizational models 
maintain explanatory power across other datasets, their perceived robustness would improve. A 
cross-country comparative analysis that integrates Polity IV and Freedom House scores would 
yield new insights. Perhaps countries more authoritarian than Egypt more quickly narrow protest 





This paper provided empirical evidence supporting the claim that the space for unfettered 
digital communication has noticeably narrowed in Egypt over the course of time studied. It 
process-traces a case study using media reports and made this claim robust by citing the similar 
conclusions of non-governmental organizations utilizing independent methodologies. Moreover, 
it demonstrated that anti-regime protest in Egypt has declined over the course of time studied, as 
analyzed via a coding of ACLED’s dataset via an extensive methodology, a multiple-interrupted 
time series impact assessment and external scholarly studies of regional power consolidation in 
the wake of the Arab Uprisings.  
The insufficiency of measuring mobilization via protester and event counts motivates 
research into more effective proxies. This paper undertook an event-centric approach that 
distinguished the potential for an event relative to all events from an event’s actual results 
relative to that of those in the same class. Population density, justified grievance, resource 
expenditure, and the on-the-ground actions attempted supplement protester-count mobilization 
models and yield significant stronger explanatory power for this case. The paper’s metric 
contributes language by which the social movement discipline can discuss trends in 
mobilizational capacity. Its distinctions suggest a method for systematically evaluating patterns 
that are otherwise challenging to assess, although not without the potential for the spuriousness 
of other conditions, which continue to impact the literature. 
el-Sisi’s cyberregulations appear to have foreclosed the political opportunity structure for 
small-scale mobilization events but had no effect at other mobilizational levels. These results are 
consistent with the literature’s assessment of internet repression tools. Police pressure does not 
appear to share a statistically significant relationship with decreasing mobilization levels, but the 
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data studied are not aggregated at the location-level. Deeper investigations into specific, protest-
prevalent city quarters over time would shed further light into this relationship. Arrests do not, 
from the results presented here, offer an effective proxy for protest-counting, but more intensive 
process-tracing is necessary to credit the results.  
These findings contribute to discussions regarding the “newness” of the internet for 
politics. Rød and Weidmann (2015) identify no empirical evidence supportive of Diamond’s 
“Liberation Technology” thesis (2012), and find no internet effect for political institutions or 
democratic transition in authoritarian states. This paper’s results supplement the claim that 
digital surveillance and censorship have little explanatory power for repression and mobilization 
by investigating a negative case by which the efficacy of those tools are systematically mitigated. 
These findings, however, do not shed light on the changed mindsets that might stem in part from 
these policies. Absent accurate survey data, it is difficult to tell if el-Sisi’s power consolidation 
has increased deep-seated resentment and frustration among Egyptians. Given that the policies 
studied in this paper are consistent with el-Sisi’s repression efforts, it seems plausible that 
Egyptians would associate these and similar regulations with increasing authoritarianism. The 
2011 Arab Uprisings came as a surprise to many scholars who had studied the region for decades 
(Brown, 2014), even as later analyses have explained the revolutions in terms of historical 
factors ranging from “deep-seated resentment at the aging Arab dictatorships…anger at the 
brutality of the security apparatus, unemployment… and the corruption that followed the 
privatization of state assets” (Manfreda, 2019). From this evidence, one could deduce that these 
policies, as seen when Mubarak flipped the internet kill-switch, may backfire by contributing to 
high-scale mobilizational events in the future. 
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What do these results mean for el-Sisi? On the off-chance that he or his intelligence 
services stumble upon my thesis, they should know that their digital regulation efforts curtail 
small-scale actions, but that they cannot rely on modern technological machinery to eventually 
eliminate domestic unrest. In fact, he may benefit from eliminating these policies and 
dismantling his cyberregulatory regime. We cannot rule out that foreclosing low-level potential 
opportunities, even if by perception and not in reality, “pressurizes” the Egyptian public, leaving 
them more likely to opt into seemingly instantaneous, but gradually fomenting uprisings like 





Each ACLED event of the “protesters” category that was “anti-regime” in character was graded 
in terms of its potential and actual mobilization, using the below features. 
Potential Mobilization: 
Independent variables assessed: Grievance, population density, total population of lowest-level 
administrative area, number of distinct groups involved. 
Actual Mobilization: 
Independent variables assessed: Potential mobilization of the event, total number of protesters, 
total number of protesters at events of similar potential mobilization-coded values (i.e., total 
protester yield relative to events of identical grievance, relative to events of approximately the 
same population density, number of distinct groups involved). 
An Example: 
ACLED description of event: “Approximately 150 members of Cairo’s lawyers’ syndicate 
demonstrated against the death of a colleague, who is believed to have died at the hands of 
soldiers in Matariya.” Date: 1 March 2015. 
1) Study Matariya: Matariya is a kism with a population of 80,000. For Egypt, this is a 
relatively dense space, it is a mid-rise suburb of Cairo. One can expect that many can 
access this area at low cost. 
2) Further investigate the event: Factiva search: “Cairo AND lawyer AND syndicate AND 
police DATE: 03/01/2015. Results: 1. Source: Daily News Egypt. 
a. Information gleaned from Daily News Egypt newswire: 
i. Context for the event, reasons that lawyers are protesting: They are upset 
with recent military actions and the military’s political agenda.  
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ii. Only the lawyers were involved, as part of their syndicate, this is one 
group. It’s an attorney syndicate, there are few of this demographic 
(highly educated, professional, one profession) relative to wider Egyptian 
social movements. 
iii. Code grievance as “anti-military.” 
3) Potential mobilization code: low: Small organizational capacity given the demographic 
involved, relative to wider movements. While it takes place in an urban area, this type of 
protest is not very accessible in terms of the demographic involved and their level of 
specialization. 
4) Compare event to other lawyer-syndicate protests (3 in the dataset, each coded as 
potential-low. 150 protesters are more than average for this category. Compare to 
syndicated protests generally; among journalist-led protests (closer to 20 in the dataset), 
150 protesters are slightly below average. 
a. Actual mobilization code: medium: This event doesn’t demonstrate a clear outlier 
in either direction relative to similar events. 
Descriptive Criteria: 
POP_ADMIN2: [#] = Census driven location population, rounded to the nearest thousand. 
MARKAZ_OR_KISM: [m, k] = Density-descriptor assigned by Egypt for each subdivision. 
POT_MOB_LEVEL: [LOW, MED, HIGH] = The level of mobilization that could have been 
achieved.  
MOB_LEVEL: [LOW, MED, HIGH] = The graded level of mobilization achieved as a function 
of potential mobilization. Makes use of the population proportion taken from government census. 
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GRIEVANCE = Precise category of prevailing grievance issued by protesters. All data coded are 
generally anti-regime. In this dataset, I coded for Pro-Islamism, Anti-Military, Pro-Morsi, Anti-
Policy, Anti-Sisi, Pro-Sisi, and Unknown. 
MEDIA_MENTIONS: [#] = The number of different articles reporting the event from key media 
companies from each case and searches through their websites, counting the number of times 
that the protest appeared over 240 hours following the event. 
ORG_ATTENDANCE: [#] = The number of social organizations participating in the protest. 
ARRESTS_REPORTED = The number of arrests reported by media sources. 
PROTEST_ESTIMATE [#] = Estimate based on media description. 
OTHER_NOTES: Other information of significance gathered during data collection. 
 
 
X: EVENT TIMELINE 
Mubarak assumes the presidency – 1981 
Mubarak’s NTRA Telecommunications Law (bans encryption, foreign VoIP) – 29 Dec 2003  
Arab Uprisings – 2010-2012 
NTRA pulls initial kill switch – 25-28 January 2011 
Mubarak resigns – 11 February 2011 
Morsi sworn in – 30 June 2012 
Arab Republic Constitution ratified – 22 December 2012 
Morsi unseated – 3 July 2013 
Protesting without a permit banned – 25 November 2013  
SCAF installs new constitution – 18 January 2014 
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Internet terrorism bill – 31 January 2014 
Muslim Brotherhood banned – 15 April 2014 
El-Sisi sworn in – 8 June 2014 
Revealed that Egypt acquired spyware technology, from two separate sources – 7 July 2015  
Punitive Internet Terrorism Bill – 1 August 2015 – another source, bbc 
New VoIP restrictions – 1 October 2015 
Ban on Facebook Free Basics – 3 January 2016 
Qatari websites deemed “mouths of Muslim Brotherhood” blocked – 5 January 2016 
Legislation begins for December regulation bill – 10 May 2016 
Egypt blocks Signal, which quickly circumvents the block – 12 December 2016 
Inst. regulation of the Press and the Media (establishes  SCAM), breakdown – 26 Dec 2016 
State of emergency declared – 9 April 2017 
Terrorism law amendments – 19 April 2017  
Uptick in website blocking – 24 May 2017  
Significant uptick in website blocking ahead of elections – 14 March 2018 
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